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Abstract
This paper considers the interactions between governance, educational
outcomes, and economic performance. More specifically, we seek to estab-
lish the linkages by which institutional quality affect growth by considering
its mediating impact on education. While the contribution of both human
capital and institutions to growth are often acknowledged, the channels by
which institutions affect human capital and, in turn, growth, has been rel-
atively underexplored. Our empirical approach adopts a two-stage strat-
egy that estimates national-level educational production functions which
include institutional governance as a covariate, and uses these estimates
as instruments for human capital in cross-country growth regressions.
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1 Introduction
One of the enduring puzzles in the study of human capital and income has been
the apparent inconsistency between the empirical micro- and macro-econometric
evidence. Studies using Mincer (1974)-style earnings functions generally find
that educational levels is one of the strongest predictors of lifetime income,
but this intuitive result does not generally survive aggregation: Educational
attainment is, by most measures, largely unrelated to national income.
Earlier studies that considered the contribution of human capital to growth
(Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer & Weil 1992) typically found a large and signifi-
cant influence of such capital—as proxied by enrollment rates—on income per
capita. However, later papers (Benhabib & Spiegel 1994; Pritchett 2001) have
not only found an insignificant contribution, but in some cases have actually
established a negative relationship between human capital and income.
This stands in stark contrast to a very large body of microeconometric labor
research that has found a strong and persistent relationship between educational
levels and wage rates. Although estimates are noisy and may depend on the time
period chosen, the general result that earnings increase linearly with schooling
completion has been found to hold for both U.S. (Heckman, Lochner & Todd
2006) as well as international (Peracchi 2006) data.
This micro-macro incongruence has led to various efforts aimed at resolving
the paradox. One approach argues that human capital is either poorly mea-
sured or mismeasured. This approach stresses how existing education stock data
may either fail to capture important quality dimensions (Behrman & Birdsall
1983; Hanushek & Kimko 2000), or may suffer from systematic data deficiencies
(Cohen & Soto 2007; Dome´nech & de la Fuente 2006). Accounting for these
measurement issues would then resolve the paradox.
Another school of thought has stressed the importance of educational gov-
ernance failures. Factors such as teacher absenteeism, informal payments, and
corruption in schools erode the productivity of the education sector (Reinikka
& Svensson 2005; Rogers 2008) and reduce the incentives for human capital ac-
cumulation (Gupta, Davoodi & Tiongson 2001). This is an institutional failure,
which can subsequently spill over into growth outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robinson 2005; Galor, Moav & Vollrath 2008). Given the poor institutional en-
vironment in which learning occurs, the failure of traditional educational statis-
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tics to capture the actual stock of human capital is hardly surprising.
These two resolutions are not unrelated; governance failures often imply poor
quality of education. Nonetheless, authors have tended to stress one approach
over another.1
The major challenge in the empirical study of the role of human capital
in growth is centered of the endogeneity of human capital. While there is a
strong theoretical basis for how human capital can drive growth in both neo-
classical (Lucas 1988) and endogenous (Romer 1990) models, there is also the
possibility of reverse causality, possibly through a discount rate channel (Bils &
Klenow 2000). This endogeneity suggests that na¨ıve attempts to measure the
contribution of human capital will encounter a bias in their estimates.
Our empirical approach adopts a two-stage strategy: First, we estimate
national-level educational production functions that include institutional gov-
ernance and inputs to schooling as covariates. Second, we use these estimates
from the first stage as instruments for human capital in cross-country regres-
sions of steady-state income. This method not only provides new cross-country
estimates of the impact of governance measures on educational outcomes, but
also addresses the endogeneity concerns that arise when using direct measures
of education in a regressions of this nature.
Moreover, our use of instrumental variables (IV) allows us to reconcile the
two major explanations that have been advanced to resolve the micro-macro
human capital puzzle. By including governance measures in the education pro-
duction function, we directly account for the institutional framework in which
human capital accumulation occurs. The methodology also allows us to sidestep
the concerns surrounding the mismeasurement of human capital, so long as our
instruments are chosen carefully and satisfy the necessary validity conditions.
The paper closest in spirit to our own is that of Hanushek & Kimko (2000),
who use a similar two-step estimation procedure but estimate a growth equa-
tion in the second stage. Unlike these authors, however, we motivate our model
directly from a theoretical augmented Solow growth model, and our empirical
strategy does not require us to generate projections of unavailable data in order
to obtain a sufficiently-sized sample. In addition, we include governance mea-
sures that we regard as both theoretically and empirically important for human
capital production. Our approach is also complementary to the work of Glaeser,
La Porta, Lo´pez-de Silanes & Shleifer (2004), who also use a two-stage strategy
to argue that human capital, rather than institutions, is a stronger predictor of
per capita income. Unlike them, we employ a different choice of instruments,
and our substantive concern is driven by a neoclassical growth model, rather
than a “fundamental determinants” (Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 2004) ap-
proach.
Our main results are supportive of the notion that schooling is central to
1Pritchett (2001) further argues that the results could be due to stagnant demand for
education labor in developing countries. This explanation is less likely, however, given both
international (Berman, Bound & Machin 1998) and plant-level evidence that suggests that
the demand for skilled labor is reasonably strong in many developing countries (Fajnzylber &
Fernandes 2008; Harrison & Hanson 1999; Pavcnik 2003).
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economic growth. Our benchmark specifications find that a 1 percent increase
in human capital contributes 3.02–3.33 percent to income per capita, and this
contribution outstrips that of physical capital. In our robustness tests, we also
show that this result survives the inclusion of additional explanatory variables
in the second stage, as well as the use of alternative specifications in the first
stage, including specifications allowing governance to be endogenous to income
and/or endogenous to human capital.2 We also demonstrate that the main
results follow even when we alter our specification to exploit panel data.
Our findings are of considerable academic and policy interest. Empirical
studies of human capital have frequently been hampered by the difficulty of
isolating the causal impact of education on per capita income. Furthermore, to
the extent that institutions are themselves subject to change, corroborating the
body of microeconomic evidence on governance and education provides further
impetus for institutional reform in developing countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present the
motivating theoretical model. We then report the empirical results in Section 3,
before a final section concludes with policy implications.
2 A Simple Model of Growth, Human Capital,
and Governance
Our motivating theoretical model is an augmented Solow (1956) growth model,
expanded to allow for three reproducible factors: Labor, L, physical capital, K,
and human capital, H (Mankiw et al. 1992). Output at time t is generated by
the production function
Yt = Kαt H
β
t (AtLt)
1−α−β
, 0 < α, β < 1, (1)
where A is the current level of (exogenous) technology, and we assume decreasing
returns to all capital, so that α+ β < 1.
The microeconomic literature on the education production function (Todd
& Wolpin 2003) argues that cognitive achievement for a given individual i is
determined by innate ability, η, family inputs, F , and school inputs, S. At the
individual level, human capital at time t is therefore a function
Hit = h (ηi, Fit, Sit;Gt) ,
where G is the (exogenous) institutional environment whereby learning takes
place, and we assume that individual ability is time-invariant. Aggregating over
all effective units of labor gives
Ht =
∫ AtLt
1
h (ηi, Fit, Sit;Gt) di
= FtγSt (AtLt)
1−γ− ·Gφt , 0 < γ,  < 1,
(2)
2Lipset (1960) argues that both economic growth and human capital accumulation cause
institutional change, a hypothesis supported by Glaeser et al. (2004).
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where we further assume a Cobb-Douglas form and decreasing returns to inputs
with γ+  < 1. Note the omission of the ability term at the aggregate level; this
amounts to assuming that innate ability is distributed normally across countries
at the global level, such that there are no significant cross-country differences.
Taking logarithms of (2) gives the (steady-state) amount of human capital per
effective unit of labor:
ln
[
Ht
Lt
]
= lnA0 + gt+ γ ln f +  ln s+ φG, (3)
where we follow convention and rewrite f ≡ FAL and s ≡ SAL in intensive form,
representing family and school inputs per unit of effective labor.
Technology progresses and labor grows at exogenous rates described by
At = L0egt, Lt = L0ent,
giving capital accumulation according to the ordinary differential equations
k˙t = skyt − (n+ g + δ) kt, (4a)
h˙t = shyt − (n+ g + δ)ht, (4b)
where sk and sh are, respectively, the investment shares of physical and human
capital, δ is the rate of capital depreciation, and as before y ≡ YAL , k ≡ KAL , and
h ≡ HAL are in intensive form.
The steady state levels of physical and human capital are straightforward,
and given by
k∗ =
[
s1−βk s
β
h
n+ g + δ
] 1
1−α−β
, h∗ =
[
sαk s
1−α
h
n+ g + δ
] 1
1−α−β
.
Substitution into (1), taking logarithms, and re-substituting the steady-state
share of human capital back into the resulting equation yields steady-state in-
come per worker given by
ln
[
Y
L
]
= lnA0 + gt+
α
1− α ln sk +
β
1− α lnh
∗ − α
1− α ln (n+ g + δ) . (5)
Together, (3) and (5) are the system of two equations that we take to the data.
5
3 Empirical Tests of Income, Education, and In-
stitutions
3.1 Empirical Model
Our empirical model is based on the system of equations summarized by (3)
and (5):
ln
[
Hit
Lit
]
= θ0 + µi + θ1Git + ln
[
Fit
Lit
]
Θ2 + ln
[
Sit
Lit
]
Θ3 + εit, (6)
ln
[
Yit
Lit
]
= pi0 + ρi + pi1 ln sk,it + pi2 ln
[
Hit
Lit
]
− pi3 ln (n+ g + δ)
+ XitΠ4 + νit,
(7)
where Git is governance, Fit and Sit are vectors of family and school inputs to
human capital production for country i at time t, respectively, Hit is human
capital, sk,it = IitYit is the investment share of GDP, (n+ g + δ) = n+0.05 is the
net rate of depreciation of effective units of labor,3 Xit is a vector of additional
controls, Yit is GDP, µi and ρi are time-invariant country fixed effects, and
εit ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
and νit ∼ N
(
0, σ2ν
)
are i.i.d. disturbance terms. The theoretical
prior for our main coefficient of interest, pi2, is positive.
In our robustness section, we populate the vector Xit with several other con-
trols that have been found to be important in cross-country growth regressions.
Similarly, we have entered family and school inputs as vectors, to accommo-
date the fact that the education production function literature has identified
a host of possible candidates for important inputs to student achievement. In
our benchmark specifications, we maintain parsimony with only one input for
F and S; we relax this restriction in our robustness section.
3.2 Estimation and Identification Strategy
In our benchmark tests, we employ three main variables in our first-stage re-
gressions. Of these three, two are plausibly exogenous, and could function as
instruments; the third may suffer from simultaneity concerns, and is only used
in conjunction with our other instruments.
Our first, and primary, instrument is government effectiveness. Although
there are potentially many channels by which an effective government bureau-
cracy can affect economic outcomes, we contend that the primary means by
which this occurs is through service delivery, and in particular the delivery of
educational services. In many countries, especially developing ones, educational
expenditure is one of—if not the—largest components of total public expen-
diture, and education at the primary and secondary level is largely publicly-
provided. If government effectiveness does matter to growth, there is a strong
3We follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and assume that g and δ are constant across countries
and their sum is approximated by calibrated data of 0.02 and 0.03, respectively.
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likelihood that it does so mainly through its mediating effect on the delivery of
education. We visually capture the relationship between governance and human
capital in Figure 1.
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Source: Authors’ calculations, using Barro & Lee (2001) and Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2007)
Relationship Between Human Capital and Governance
Figure 1: Positive relationship between quality of institutional governance and
mean years of schooling, 2000, with fitted regression line. The (bivariate) re-
gression is significant at conventional levels.
There are two other main channels by which effective government may affect
economic outcomes. The most (ostensibly) obvious channel is through policy,
especially macroeconomic policy. While this may be a plausible theoretical con-
sideration, this seems to be less of an issue in practice. There is fairly abundant
evidence that policy variables do not exert a systematic influence on economic
growth (Levine & Renelt 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997).4 The second channel is
through the public financial management. Again, while severe mismanagement
of public finances—in the form of corruption—have been found to affect growth
directly, empirical work has struggled to establish a strong first-order effect of
government expenditures on growth, especially when untempered by the qual-
ity of governance (Rajkumar & Swaroop 2008). As a consequence, the quality
of public financial management is unlikely to have a direct effect on economic
growth.
Nonetheless, in order to rule out any remaining simultaneity concerns, we use
a lagged specification of the effectiveness variable. Overall, we are reasonably
4This should perhaps be qualified. There is some evidence that very bad policy choices—
such as financial repression or severe trade restrictions—may negatively affect country perfor-
mance. However, policies that can be directly associated with government effectiveness—such
as monetary and fiscal policy—tend to be insignificant in standard cross-country growth re-
gressions.
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confident that government effectiveness satisfies the exclusion restriction in the
first stage. For completeness, however, we also provide a formal test of the
strength of this particular assumption when we discuss the benchmark results.
The second instrument that we use is the consumption-investment ratio,
which acts as a proxy for family inputs into education. To the extent that
household educational expenditures is an investment good, the C/I ratio offers
a plausibly exogenous instrument for family inputs that is not, theoretically,
systematically related to the level of income per capita. While an obvious
candidate for household inputs is income per capita, it is essentially the same as
the left-hand-side variable in the second stage regression, and thus clearly not
exogenous.
Our final variable is the pupil-teacher ratio, which is our proxy for school
inputs. We choose this variable, instead of other candidates, in part due to the
strong case made for class size as a key determinant of schooling outcomes due
to school resources (Krueger 2003), and in part because of its availability across
countries and time. There are some legitimate concerns of simultaneity bias in
including this variable: Countries with higher incomes per capita are likely to be
able to afford to increase schooling resources, lowering the pupil-teacher ratio.
Without a measure of school inputs, the tradeoff is efficiency of the estimates
due to a poorer fit in the first stage; we report specifications with and without
the inclusion of this variable.
The remaining endogeneity issue is that of omitted variable bias. While it
is possible that government effectiveness or the consumption-investment ratio
can influence income per capita through an intervening omitted variable, or is
affected by an omitted variable that also affects income per capita, this is not
suggested by our theoretical model. Moreover, we are inclined toward a fairly
parsimonious model, given the general lack of robustness of other, atheoretical
explanatory variables that have been advanced in the literature. However, we
take steps to address this issue in our robustness section.
Estimation of the model is via two-stage least squares, using two-step gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. For robustness tests using panel data, we run both fixed effects
IV-GMM with correction for heteroskedasticity, clustering, and serial correla-
tion, as well as system GMM using the orthogonal deviations transformation for
the endogenous regressors (Arellano & Bover 1995) and Windmeijer-corrected
standard errors. In most of our specifications, our model is overidentified, and
we accordingly report the Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions.
3.3 Data Description
Our cross-country macroeconomic data are drawn mainly from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. We supplement these with data from several
other sources. Our primary measure of the human capital stock is the Barro &
Lee (2001) dataset on educational attainment. Our supplementary educational
data were mainly from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics’ Global Education
Statistics database. Our primary governance data were the Worldwide Gover-
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nance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2007), which not only provides
disaggregation into the subcomponents that we need, but are also, in our view,
the highest-quality data available.
The specific measures employed, as well as other data sources and additional
controls used in the robustness tests, are described in full in the data appendix.
3.4 Main Findings
In Table 1 we report the main results of our benchmark model. Specification
(B1 ) is the least squares estimates for the augmented Solow model consistent
with (7). The sample comprises 103 countries, and the model provides a rea-
sonably good fit. The human capital contribution is statistically significant,
and enters with the expected sign. However, endogeneity concerns lead us to
discount these results.
Table 1: Benchmark regressions of GDP per capita†
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6)
Second stage income equation
Investment 0.432 0.836 1.097 -0.002 0.689 0.255
share (0.34) (0.47)∗ (0.48)∗∗ (0.42) (0.27)∗∗ (0.32)
Net rate of -0.900 0.815 0.801 1.889 0.744 1.695
depreciation (0.63) (0.99) (1.02) (0.74)∗∗ (0.98) (0.69)∗∗
Human 1.840 3.125 3.142 3.329 3.024 3.250
capital (0.23)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.44)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.32)∗∗∗
Constant 4.111 7.231 7.547 8.616 6.954 8.545
(1.58)∗∗ (2.35)∗∗∗ (2.56)∗∗∗ (1.84)∗∗∗ (2.33)∗∗∗ (1.79)∗∗∗
First stage human capital equation
Family -0.359 -0.753 -0.377
resources (0.29) (0.32)∗∗ (0.24)
School -0.557 -0.626 -0.548
resources (0.20)∗∗∗ (0.22)∗∗∗ (0.17)∗∗∗
Governance 0.136 0.137 0.251 0.277
(0.06)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗
Broad 0.116
governance (0.07)∗
Constant 1.657 1.749 1.760 -1.971 -1.694
(1.39) (1.50) (1.03)∗ (0.96)∗∗ (0.71)∗∗
Adj R2 0.715 0.534 0.498 0.434 0.591 0.508
Anderson LR 31.544∗∗∗ 29.135∗∗∗ 40.837∗∗∗ 27.779∗∗∗ 39.049∗∗∗
Cragg-Donald F 12.315 11.252 24.789 15.615 45.639
Hansen J 1.717 1.535 0.255 0.032 -
N 103 64 60 83 78 103
† Notes: Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in parentheses. First stage regressions
included second stage controls as instruments, but are not reported. Hansen statistics for
exactly identified models are replaced with a dash. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level,
∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
The top half of column (B2 ) reports the IV estimates for the baseline specifi-
cation. In this specification, we use the pupil-teacher ratio as a proxy for school
inputs, and the consumption-investment ratio as a proxy for family inputs. Due
to data limitations, the full sample falls to 64 countries. Our main coefficient
of interest, pi2, remains positive and statistically (and economically) significant.
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The contribution of capital is also consistent with the theoretical prior, but only
marginally significant. The Sargan-Hansen J statistic (χ2 = 2.59, p = 0.27)
indicates that the instruments are valid. The Anderson LR statistic for underi-
dentification is significant, and the Cragg-Donald F for weak instruments is rea-
sonably high (F = 12.32, Stock-Yogo F crit = 9.08 for 10% relative bias); both
suggest that the instruments satisfy the relevance condition. Finally, the partial
R2 of the first-stage regression (not reported) is reasonably strong (R2 = 0.39);
since there is only one endogenous regressor, this result further corroborates the
test for weak indentification (F = 9.78, p = 0.00).
The bottom half of column (B2 ) reports the corresponding first stage results.
While these estimates are of secondary interest, we note that the coefficients
are consistent with the expected signs (recall that the pupil-teacher ratio is
expected to be negatively related to human capital), and both school inputs
and governance are significant at the 5% level. Finally, it is helpful to point out
that, unlike Rogers (2008), our empirical strategy introduces the governance
dimension directly as a covariate into the education production function, instead
of separating the data into subsamples according to their level of governance.
Besides being implied by our theoretical model of Section 2, we also regard this
approach as a more direct test of the role that institutional governance might
(or might not) play in the determination of human capital accumulation.
For reasons of identification, we have chosen to restrict our measure of gov-
ernance to government effectiveness. Other than econometric reasons, there is a
theoretical reason for doing so. The use of the more comprehensive definition of
governance runs the risk of being tautological: If good institutions are defined,
ex ante, as those structures and mechanisms that are most likely to enhance
growth, then it is small wonder that, ex post, institutions are found to directly
affect growth. Governance then becomes significant because we have defined it
to be so. However, in order to allay concerns regarding the possibility that our
choice of governance indicators are ad hoc, in column (B3 ) we repeat the above
specification, but with one change: We expand the governance measure to all
the six dimensions listed in Kaufmann et al. (2007). Our results are essentially
unchanged. However, the adjusted R2 for the first stage is lower, and the coef-
ficient in this case is only weakly significant. We consider this a validation of
our choice of a narrower definition of governance.
To account for remaining econometric concerns concerning our choice of
instruments, we take three further steps: First, we exclude family inputs alto-
gether, treating all measures of income as endogenous to the model. Second,
we exclude school inputs, which as we discussed earlier may suffer from simul-
taneity bias. Third, we exclude all family and school inputs and rely solely on
governance to identify the effect of human capital on income level and growth.
These are reported in columns (B4 ) through (B6 ), respectively. The coefficient
pi2 remains robust through these three changes, although these are not directly
comparable due to changes in the sample size that result from differential data
availability.
Taken together, the IV results reported in Table 1 suggest that a 1 percent
increase in human capital contributes between 3.02–3.33 percent to income per
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capita. By way of comparison, physical capital—the only other control variable
to feature some significant coefficients across the different specifications—has
a contribution that is about three to five times smaller, ranging from 0.69–
1.10 percent. As is common for cross-country growth regressions, the large and
significant constant term suggests that a substantial unexplained component
remains.
These specifications also satisfy the primary diagnostic tests for instrument
validity. We note that the Hansen J cannot be computed for specification (B6 ),
since the specification is just identified; this specification thus relies on the va-
lidity of the exclusion restriction (as discussed in Subsection 3.2). To formally
test the validity of this important assumption, we exploit a recent procedure
developed by Kraay (2008), which utilizes Bayesian inference to explicitly char-
acterize the extent to which prior uncertainty about the assumption affects the
posterior distribution of pi2.5
We report these tests in Table 2, for differing assumptions with regard to
the strength of the prior belief that the exclusion restriction holds exactly. This
strength is given by the parameter ω, with higher (lower) values representing
greater (lesser) certainty that the exclusion restriction is valid. The supports—
for the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles—are chosen to correspond to a 95 percent
confidence interval; changes in the interquantile range are also reported.
Table 2: Tests of validity of exclusion restriction for governance†
ω = 5 ω = 10 ω = 100 ω = 200 ω = 500 ω =∞
Posterior distribution for pi2
2.5th percentile 1.49 2.02 2.70 2.74 2.80 2.82
Mode 3.52 3.54 3.53 3.54 3.55 3.55
97.5th percentile 6.12 5.62 4.83 4.86 4.80 4.75
Change in interquantile range 4.63 3.60 2.13 2.12 2.00 1.93
† Notes: Posterior distributions calculated assuming that the distribution of prior probabilities
that the exclusion restriction holds at 10% level. Corresponding supports are |0.46|, |0.34|,
|0.12|, |0.08|, |0.05|, and 0, respectively.
Relative to the case where there is no prior uncertainty about the exclusion
restriction (ω = ∞), the supports for the posterior distribution widens (from
1.93 to 4.63) as there is greater uncertainty (ω → 5), as expected. However,
the mode remains stable, and even in the case of extreme uncertainty about the
validity of the exclusion restriction (ω = 5), the interval does not include zero,
signifying the strength of the instrument. An alternative way of looking at this
result is captured in Figure 2; here, while greater uncertainty over instrument
validity leads to a wider dispersion in possible pi2 values, this change in the
distribution is sufficiently small that the contribution of human capital continues
to matter.6
5The details of the analysis are described briefly in Appendix A.2.
6An important consideration of the tests are what the results would be if the distribution
of priors was not centered on zero; in particular, if it were centered on a positive value. In this
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Figure 2: Posterior distribution for coefficient of human capital, with alternative
assumptions about the validity of the exclusion restriction. Lower values of ω
indicate greater prior uncertainty that the instrument satisfies the orthogonality
condition. Even with high levels of uncertainty, the posterior distribution of the
slope coefficient does not include zero.
3.5 Robustness Tests
In the benchmark models, we did not introduce any additional controls to ex-
plain cross-country income per capita. Here, we allow X to include variables
that the literature has identified as important. More specifically, we draw on a
selection of the variables that Levine & Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997)
argue are robust empirical relations: The trade share of GDP, geographic lo-
cation, and infrastructure.7 To this we include some relatively more recent
candidates in the empirical growth literature: Ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(Easterly & Levine 1997), democratic development (Barro 1996), and social
capital (Knack & Keefer 1997). These are reported in columns (R1 )–(R6 ) of
Table 3.
The significance of the coefficient on human capital survives the inclusion
of all these additional controls. As before, while the coefficients are not di-
rectly comparable, we note that the human capital contribution is statistically
and economically significant, with a range [2.65, 4.08]. The coefficient on phys-
ical capital is occasionally statistically significant, but its contribution is never
greater than 1.53 percent, and is always dominated by the human capital contri-
case, Kraay (2008) suggests that the nonzero mean would need to be subtracted out from the
posterior distribution, which would result in a lower value for the 2.5th percentile that may
include zero. However, since we do not have a means of reliably estimating this prior, we can
only allude to this possibility as an important caveat to the results above.
7We used road density as a proxy for infrastructure, but we also explored alternative proxies
such as the share of rural population and a weighted average of the percentage of population
with access to water and sanitation facilities. Our qualitative results were affected by these
alternatives.
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Table 3: Regressions of GDP per capita with additional controls†
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) (R6)
Investment 0.931 0.752 0.663 0.879 1.527 1.195
share (0.51)∗ (0.44)∗ (0.74) (0.47)∗ (0.73)∗∗ (0.47)∗∗
Net rate of 0.853 0.997 0.779 0.935 1.303 0.444
depreciation (1.00) (0.88) (1.13) (1.10) (1.56) (0.89)
Human 3.160 2.901 2.992 3.203 4.076 2.646
capital (0.49)∗∗∗ (0.49)∗∗∗ (0.54)∗∗∗ (0.50)∗∗∗ (0.77)∗∗∗ (0.44)∗∗∗
Trade share -0.092
(0.14)
Geography 0.152
(0.10)
Infrastructure 0.079
(0.10)
Ethnolinguistic 0.131
fractionalization (0.20)
Social 1.541
capital (1.51)
Democracy 0.206
(0.14)
Constant 7.805 7.565 6.854 7.400 6.924 7.326
(2.56)∗∗∗ (2.11)∗∗∗ (3.13)∗∗ (2.74)∗∗∗ (3.78)∗ (2.33)∗∗∗
Adj R2 0.517 0.590 0.498 0.478 0.523 0.678
Anderson LR 31.099∗∗∗ 28.409∗∗∗ 20.051∗∗∗ 24.981∗∗∗ 17.367∗∗∗ 34.238∗∗∗
Cragg-Donald F 11.888 10.636 7.044 9.084 5.984 13.677
Hansen J 1.702 2.148 1.957 1.320 0.980 2.773
N 64 63 54 63 39 58
† Notes: Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance
at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
1 percent level.
bution. None of the other variables that have been identified as important enter
significantly. Also, the instruments pass both the under- and over-identification
tests, and in most cases satisfy the tests for weak instruments as well.
We now proceed to consider alternative variables for and permutations of
our exogenous instruments.
An alternative way to qualify family inputs in the education production
function is to recognize that families with a greater share of parental authority
invested in the mother—usually due to higher levels of education attained by
them—are more likely to invest a greater share of family resources on education
(Carneiro, Meghir & Parey 2007). We use this variable as an additional instru-
ment to proxy for family inputs. We report this specification in column (Z1 ) of
Table 4. In this case, the instruments are somewhat weak, but human capital
remains positive and significant.8
Some authors have recently made a case for how genetic factors may influ-
ence growth, either in terms of genetic diversity (Ashraf & Galor 2008) or, more
specifically, through the general intelligence quotient factor g (as either as a
proxy for human capital (Jones & Schneider 2006) or as an indicator of unob-
servable individual ability in the process of human capital formation (Weede &
Ka¨mpf 2002)). There have been numerous criticisms of the use of g as a reliable
8We also explored replacing the family input variable altogether, and while our qualitative
results were unchanged, the instrument set did not satisfy the exclusion condition.
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Table 4: Regressions of GDP per capita with alternative controls†
(Z1) (Z2) (Z3) (Z4) (Z5)
Investment 1.636 0.550 0.013 -1.067 0.970
share (0.49)∗∗∗ (0.23)∗∗ (0.51) (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.42)∗∗
Net rate of 1.672 0.821 4.464 -1.313 0.306
depreciation (1.17)∗∗∗ (0.65) (1.07)∗∗∗ (0.61)∗∗ (0.82)
Human 3.556 3.242 1.788 3.073
capital (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.36)∗∗∗ (0.20)∗∗∗ (0.40)∗∗∗
Alternative 7.981
human capital (0.85)∗∗∗
Constant 10.827 6.490 -17.418 0.491 6.067
(1.75)∗∗∗ (1.72)∗∗∗ (3.07)∗∗∗ (1.46) (1.92)∗∗∗
Adj R2 0.528 0.649 0.173 0.832 0.541
Anderson LR 26.546∗∗∗ 53.722∗∗∗ 31.075∗∗∗ 36.005∗∗∗ 47.987∗∗∗
Cragg-Donald F 7.460 39.036 18.248 15.237 15.911
Hansen J 4.955∗∗∗ 2.776 0.276 4.775 12.681∗∗∗
N 54 63 68 11 64
(Z6) (Z7) (Z8) (Z9) (Z10
Investment 0.761 0.972 0.895 0.260 0.805
share (0.43)∗ (0.37)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗ (0.76) (0.49)∗
Net rate of 0.853 0.997 0.779 0.935 1.303
depreciation (1.00) (0.88) (1.13) (1.10) (1.56)
Human 3.070 3.139 2.538 1.173 1.897
capital (0.46)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.75)∗∗∗ (1.80) (1.14)∗
Governance 0.203 0.602 0.320
(0.22) (1.65) (0.55)
Constant 6.886 7.493 7.096 4.182 5.700
(2.20)∗∗∗ (2.29)∗∗∗ (1.98)∗∗∗ (1.93)∗∗ (1.79)∗∗∗
Adj R2 0.550 0.529 0.696 0.835 0.812
Anderson LR 31.628∗∗∗ 31.680∗∗∗ 9.507∗∗∗ 0.541 1.091
Cragg-Donald F 9.108 9.127 3.096 0.150 0.245
Hansen J 1.907 1.933 1.521 3.765∗ 4.395
N 64 64 64 34 64
† Notes: Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗
indicates significance at 1 percent level.
indicator of general intelligence.9 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note two
important reservations, both of which we regard as critical.
The first is methodological. The theoretical foundation for g is premised
on the emergence of a single general factor from hierarchical factor analysis of
test scores. The problem with inferring that general intelligence exists as a
consequence is that a general factor will always result whenever the correlation
structure of all intelligence tests are positive (Thomson 1916), which is always
true by design. The low power of such tests, especially with limited sample
sizes, casts doubt as to whether g does truly exist, or even if it does, whether it
can be accurately measured with IQ tests.
The second concern is that measures of g and their growth rates are not
stable across time; in particular, they demonstrate a positive time trend. These
9We will not delve too deeply into the large (and contentious) literature on the psychometric
measurement of intelligence and cognitive ability. Devlin, Fienberg, Resnick & Roeder (1997)
provides a good summary of the key issues in the debate.
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have been extensively documented both between ethnic groups within countries,
as well as between countries (Flynn 2007). Although many resolutions have been
proposed to explain this effect, persuasive arguments have been advanced that
changes in the cognitive or nutritional environment are responsible. Importantly
for our purposes, this implies that IQ itself may be endogenous to the level of
economic development of a country.
With these reservations in mind, we nonetheless include in our empirical
tests a measure of intelligence, due to Lynn & Vanhanen (2002),10, as a strong
proxy for all resource inputs (so that the instrument set includes only IQ and
government effectiveness).11 This is reported in column (Z2 ). As before, our
results are largely unchanged.
In the specifications listed in Table 1, we shied away from using attainment
data (in the form of test scores). By and large, the international comparability
across different test types and time periods are suspect, and where comparable
data are available, they are often only for a very limited set of (mostly devel-
oped) countries. Moreover, our instrumental variables strategy already accounts
for issues of mismeasurement, conditional on our instruments satisfying the nec-
essary exclusion conditions. Nonetheless, we use a recently-compiled database
of comparable attainment data (Altinok & Murseli 2007) to examine how our re-
sults change when we utilize a more accurate measure of human capital quality.
The results are reported in column (Z3 ).12 Human capital remains significant,
and in this case its contribution more than doubles, so that a 1 percent increase
in human capital leads to an almost 8 percent increase in output per worker.
We do note the far poorer fit of the specification, however, which we feel justifies
our decision not to use this measure as our primary measure of human capital.
The microeconometric literature on education production functions suggests
that, in addition to the pupil-teacher ratio, several other inputs have been im-
portant (Hanushek 2003; Pritchett & Filmer 1999). We include, as additional
instruments, a selection of the determinants that have been found to be more
consistently significant: The percentage of trained teachers (as a macroeconomic
proxy for teacher ability, usually measured with teachers’ years of schooling or
experience), and public education expenditures (a macroeconomic proxy for re-
sources devoted to teacher salaries and school infrastructure). This specification
is reported in column (Z4 ).13 Although the results are once again similar, we
note that the specification suffers from a small sample problem, which may limit
10The measures themselves have also been subject to dispute. The source data used in
the construction of the dataset have been criticized as being based on excessively small,
unrepresentative samples of national populations, and concerns have been raised about the
accuracy of the reported scores and about the normalization methods employed to render the
scores internationally comparable.
11Alternatively, we could have included it in (6) as a measure of innate ability, η, which
we now allow to differ between nations. Doing so did not affect the qualitative nature of our
results, but the instrument set fails the Hansen J test.
12We are again forced, by virtue of satisfying the overidentification test, to exclude family
inputs from the instrument set.
13The microeconomic literature also finds that teacher quality is a very important source
of variation in student performance (Hanushek 2003). Unfortunately, there is close to no
international data available for teacher quality.
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inference.14
The next three columns, (Z5 )–(Z7 ), introduce interaction terms between
governance and resource inputs. These are for governance and school inputs,
governance and family inputs, and family and school inputs, respectively. Al-
though not fully justified by our theoretical model, the interaction term allows
for the possibility that the efficacy of school inputs may be conditional on the
institutional environment. This is intuitively plausible, and the interaction term
also serves as a possible instrument that is orthogonal to the error term in the
second stage. Adding these interaction terms, however, does not modify our
principal conclusions concerning the coefficient for human capital, which re-
mains relatively stable throughout. Note, however, that (Z5 ) does not satisfy
the overidentification test.
Our final three specifications endogenize potentially the most problematic
instrumental variable: Government effectiveness. Column (Z8 ) uses lagged gov-
ernment effectiveness (from 1996) as an instrument for contemporaneous (year
2000) governance. The magnitude of the human capital contribution falls, but
remains significant at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient for physical capital
is also significant at the 5 percent level. Interestingly, government effectiveness
is insignificant when included in the second stage, while lagged effectiveness is
significant and positively signed in the first stage human capital equation. This
gives us confidence that the effects of good governance—at least when measured
with government effectiveness—operates primarily through its mediating role on
human capital. This is also the argument first raised in Glaeser et al. (2004),
although they arrive at their claim from a different angle. It is also consistent
with the work of Galor et al. (2008), who argue that the Great Divergence can be
attributed, in part, to the emergence of institutions that promote the formation
of human capital.
The fairly large literature that has emerged following Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robinson (2001) has utilized, as instruments for institutions, settler mortality.
We are somewhat reluctant to use these instruments, however, for two reasons.
First, while a convincing case can be made for how the historical disease envi-
ronment is a plausibly exogenous instrument for contemporary property rights
institutions—or broader definitions of institutions—the linkage is, in our view,
weaker when institutions are defined, as we do here, as the efficacy of the cur-
rent government bureaucracy. Second, recent work has questioned the quality
of the settler mortality data (Albouy 2008), and corrections to these data leads
to settler mortality becoming a weaker instrument.
For consistency with the rest of the literature, however, we include in our
instrument set settler mortality (column (Z9 )) and, following Hall & Jones
(1999), instruments corresponding to the fraction of the population of European
descent column (Z10 ) (we maintain as instruments family and school inputs).
As expected, the quality of the combined instrument set is suspect: Specification
(Z9 ) fails both the exclusion and relevance conditions, and specification (Z10 )
14Other permutations and combinations of these additional school inputs yielded similar
significant coefficients for human capital, but typically did not satisfy the overidentification
test.
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does not pass the underidentification test. In addition, the Cragg-Donald F
statistics suggest that the instruments are extremely weak. Human capital
does show up marginally significant in the latter specification, however, and
governance remains an insignificant predictor of income.
3.6 Panel Results
Due to data limitations, the estimates that have been presented thus far have
been cross-sectional in nature. It is possible to expand the sample to a panel, but
it is important to keep in mind two considerations. First, while the educational
attainment data are available for five-year intervals from 1960–2000, the panel
is unbalanced, and consequently the 116-country sample has an average of only
4 observations per country. We report the fixed effects regression, analogous to
(B1 ), in column (P1 ) of Table 5.15
Table 5: Panel regressions of GDP per capita†
(P1) (P2) (P3) (P4) (P5) (P6)
Second stage income equation
Investment 0.162 0.152 0.111 0.126 0.031 0.139
share (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
Net rate of -0.098 0.043 0.337 0.349 0.733 -0.612
depreciation (0.13) (0.13) (0.18)∗ (0.19)∗ (0.28)∗∗∗ (0.46)
Human 0.409
capital (0.11)∗∗∗
Alternative 0.323 1.503 1.546 2.183 -0.937
human capital (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.44)∗∗∗ (0.47)∗∗∗ (0.72)∗∗∗ (1.12)
Constant 8.263 8.101
(0.39)∗∗∗ (0.37)∗∗∗
First stage human capital equation
Family 0.029 0.309 0.011
resources (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
School -0.253 -0.261 -0.180
resources (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗
Governance -0.047 -0.030 -0.081
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Broad -0.032
governance (0.07)
F 9.018∗∗∗ 21.990∗∗∗ 6.173∗∗∗ 5.980∗∗∗ 5.478∗∗∗ 1.261
Anderson LR 13.012∗∗∗ 12.015∗∗∗ 12.627∗∗∗ 4.395∗
Cragg-Donald F 4.356 4.017 6.342 2.188
Hansen J 3.256 4.024 2.407 1.294
N 511 1175 435 435 658 536
† Notes: Heteroskedasticity, cluster, and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic) standard errors
reported in parentheses. With the exception of the pooled specification, regressions included
country and time fixed effects. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates
significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
Second, given that the governance and educational attainment data overlap
for only one year (2000), we need to use an alternative measure of human capital
if we wish to expand the panel in a way that allows us to preserve the use of
15The Hausman test detects systematic differences between coefficients and hence a prefer-
ence for fixed over random effects.
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government effectiveness as an instrument. We do so by substituting our human
capital measure with data on enrollment rates. The panel with enrollment rates
alone is much larger—176 countries, with an average of 7 years—and for reasons
of comparability we report the fixed effects regression using this human capital
measure in column (P2 ).
The coefficients for human capital in both of these specifications are rela-
tively small: 0.409 and 0.323, respectively, although both are statistically and
economically significant. Physical capital also appears significant in both of
these specifications, although the magnitudes of their coefficients are also cor-
respondingly smaller. As before, however, we discount these estimates because
of endogeneity concerns.
Our benchmark panel, which uses enrollment data but is otherwise analogous
to (B2 ), is reported in column (P3 ). It comprises 95 countries, with an average
of about 5 time periods per country. As noted in the introduction, the danger
that enrollment is a poor proxy measure for human capital is less of a concern
as long as our instruments are valid. The Anderson and Hansen tests confirm
that this is indeed the case, although it is important to point out that we are
forced to use contemporaneous (instead of lagged) government effectiveness as
an instrument; it is perhaps for this reason that in the coefficient on governance
in the first stage is indistinguishable from zero.
The results largely corroborate the findings of the cross section estimates,
with the coefficients on human capital being statistically significant. While
the magnitude of the contribution is somewhat smaller, it is still economically
significant: A 1 percent increase in human capital leads to a 1.5 percent increase
in per capita income. This decline is probably due to the inclusion of country
fixed effects, which would capture a good deal of idiosyncratic country-specific
variation.
In columns (P4 )–(P6 ), we make several minor perturbations to this bench-
mark. Specification (P4 ) replaces government effectiveness with the broad mea-
sure of governance, while columns (P5 ) and (P6 ) limit the instrument set by
dropping, respectively, family and school inputs as instruments. While dropping
family inputs as an instrument or using the broad measure of governance does
not affect our results in any qualitative fashion, the instrument set is weakened
considerably by the absence of school inputs. Specification (P6 ) satisfies the
relevance condition only marginally, and the utility of the model—as given by
the F test—is very low. While we report the estimates in this final model for
completeness, we are inclined to heavily discount them in our analysis.
Our final robustness check seeks to endogenize as many of the instruments
that we have used as possible; of particular concern is the possibility that gov-
ernance may be endogenous to the income equation. To do so, we exploit the
temporal nature of the panel to retrieve internal instruments based on the lags of
the endogenous variables. Table 6 reports these results using the panel with en-
rollment rates as a proxy for human capital, and contemporaneous government
effectiveness as the measure of governance.
The specifications are as follows: (S1 ) System GMM estimates of (5), with
governance, with one-period lagged GMM-style internal instruments and fam-
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ily and school resources treated as fully exogenous IV-style instruments;16 (S2 )
Specification (S1 ), but without family and school inputs as exogenous instru-
ments; (S3 ) Specification (S1 ), but with year dummies as additional exogenous
instruments; (S4 ) Specification (S1 ), but with two-period lagged GMM-style
internal instruments; (S5 ) Specification (S1 ), but with a broad governance mea-
sure; and (S6 ) All variables in (3) included as explanatory variables in (5), with
one-period lagged GMM-style internal instruments.
Table 6: Regressions of GDP per capita with internal instruments†
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6)
Investment -0.317 -0.352 0.189 0.147 0.553 -0.791
share (0.37) (0.42) (0.20) (0.20) (0.26)∗∗ (0.35)∗∗
Net rate of 0.190 0.554 0.412 -0.332 -0.043 -0.013
depreciation (1.15) (0.78) (1.22) (0.73) (0.75) (0.78)
Human 1.651 1.674 1.471 1.277 1.323 0.816
capital (0.34)∗∗∗ (0.32)∗∗∗ (0.30)∗∗∗ (0.22)∗∗∗ (0.18)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗
Governance 0.774 0.519 0.698 0.700 0.352
(0.26)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗ (0.13)∗∗∗ (0.18)∗
Broad 0.740
governance (0.11)∗∗∗
Family -0.550
resources (0.29)∗
School -1.086
resources (0.56)∗
Constant 2.255 3.134 4.246 2.984 4.130 8.718
(3.42) (2.38) (2.83) (1.66)∗ (1.73)∗∗ (5.12)∗
F 22.405∗∗∗ 30.411∗∗∗ 61.002∗∗∗ 77.530∗∗∗ 48.714∗∗∗ 60.737∗∗∗
Arellano AR(1) 1.022 0.198 -1.170 -1.381 -0.106 -0.857
Arellano AR(2) 1.016 1.072 0.560 1.377 1.959∗∗∗ -0.052
Hansen J 39.123 53.451∗∗∗ 45.149 88.030 82.110 63.305
N 445 808 445 445 511 445
† Notes: Heteroskedasticity, cluster, and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic) standard errors
reported in parentheses. A constant term and time dummies were included in the regressions,
but not reported. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5
percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
We make three comments about the results. First, the instrument set is rea-
sonably sound. With the exception of specification (S2 ), the instruments satisfy
the overidentifying restrictions, and the Arellano-Bond test for both AR(1) and
AR(2) autocorrelation is satisfied (exempting AR(2) serial correlation in spec-
ification (S5 )). Although not reported, the difference-in-Sargan tests for the
(strict) exogeneity of the instrument subsets are generally satisfied.
Second, the coefficient on human capital is significant across all the specifi-
cations, ranging from 0.816–1.651 (with the lower bound only marginally signif-
icant). As before, the human capital contribution swamps the physical capital
share, and in many cases by an order of magnitude.17 Once again, we have
16Strictly speaking, system GMM also uses first differences of endogenous regressors as
additional instruments, but this difference structure does not vary since additional lagged
differences would lead to redundant moment conditions.
17Although investment share is incorrectly signed in some specifications, these estimates are
generally statistically indistinguishable from zero. In the one specification where the coefficient
on physical capital is significant, it is correctly signed.
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validation that human capital is an economically crucial determinant of income
patterns.
Third, our measure of governance enters significantly across the different
specifications as well, with magnitudes that are about half that of the coefficient
on human capital. This stands in contrast to our findings reported in the cross-
section (Table 4), and deserves some explanation. The crucial difference to note
is that our measure of governance in this case is contemporaneous, rather than
lagged, government effectiveness.
Why might this lead to problems? Our estimation method (system GMM)
uses weak exogeneity—the assumption that current explanatory variables are
not affected by future innovations in income—as an identification strategy.
While this may be plausible for human and physical capital, the fact that the
current stock of human capital is likely to be affected by past realizations of
governance quality means that the simultaneity problem is not completely elim-
inated when we include current levels of governance as a covariate on the right
hand side. In other words, we cannot rule out the possibility that anticipated
future levels of income may affect current governance levels, which violates the
assumption of weak exogeneity. This may account for the significance of the gov-
ernance variable, although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that
our theoretical model suffers from misspecification concerns.
3.7 Subsample Analysis
Given the centrality of institutional differences, we perform one final set of
analyses to tease out the mechanism driving our results. We dissect the panel
into subsamples corresponding to the following: (a) The top and bottom fiftieth
percentiles of the distribution; (b) Half a standard deviation above and below
the mean; (c) One standard deviation above and below the mean, all with
respect to the broad institutional governance measure.18 These are reported in
Table 7.
We offer three remarks about the results. First, compromising the sam-
ple size typically reduces the strength of the instruments, as reflected in both
the over and under-identification tests (especially for the specification in col-
umn four), as well as the Cragg-Donald weak instrument tests. This gives us
less confidence that endogeneity problems have been fully addressed, and this
may also account for the generally smaller point estimates for the coefficient on
human capital.
Second, this reduction in sample size also significantly reduces the explana-
tory power of the model in general. The F statistics in the final two columns are
insignificant, as are all the coefficients on the covariates. First stage results (not
reported) further suggest a very poor fit for instruments, with low F statistics
and insignificant controls.
18We also explored subsamples pivoted about the mean, and with larger deviations from
the mean, but these subsamples did not yield any additional qualitative insight, and in some
cases were not estimable due to small sample sizes.
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Table 7: Panel regressions of GDP per capita, by institutional quality†
< p50 > p50 < µ− 12σ > µ+ 12σ < µ− σ > µ+ σ
Investment 0.115 0.047 0.169 0.152 -0.080 0.139
share (0.07)∗ (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)∗ (0.16) (0.11)
Net rate of 0.228 0.155 0.162 -0.148 -0.789 -0.050
depreciation (0.20) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (1.59) (0.15)
Human 0.674 2.497 0.568 1.290 0.170 -0.512
capital (0.29)∗∗ (0.95)∗∗∗ (0.27)∗∗ (0.78)∗ (0.14) (1.02)
F 5.298∗∗∗ 4.919∗∗∗ 6.069∗∗∗ 5.044∗∗∗ 0.619 0.486
Anderson LR 10.491∗∗∗ 11.354∗∗∗ 17.929∗∗∗ 4.524 16.056∗∗∗ 3.508
Cragg-Donald F 3.501 3.798 6.221 1.471 6.059 1.116
Hansen J 1.882 2.216 1.369 6.780∗∗ 0.325 2.085
N 203 224 130 144 30 95
† Notes: Heteroskedasticity, cluster, and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic) standard errors
reported in parentheses. Sample sizes above and below the median differ because not all
controls were available for full-sample estimation. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level,
∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
Third, and most interestingly, human capital appears to matter in institu-
tional environments that are either relatively strong or relatively weak. While
this may simply be a consequence of the restricted sample, there is reason to
believe otherwise. Subsample regressions that dissect the data into regions or
income groups (reported in Appendix A.3) find significant coefficients on human
and physical capital, despite some of these subsamples possessing even smaller
sample sizes. What is more likely is that countries that fall in the extremes of
the institutional quality distribution face systematically different challenges in
translating human capital investments into growth outcomes.
For countries with extremely poor quality of institutions—such as Guinea,
Laos, and Sudan—improvements in human capital alone are unlikely to make a
dent in growth, unless accompanied by institutional improvements that render
such investments productive in the context of the broader economy. At the other
end of the spectrum, countries that have already accumulated a large stock
of human capital—such as Belgium, Finland, and Sweden—may face strong
diminishing returns to additional investments in education. While schooling
may still matter for lifetime incomes at the individual level, the marginal returns
to an additional unit human capital at the country level would be much smaller.
More generally, the results in Table 7 can be interpreted in the light of equa-
tions (3) and (5). In countries with low quality of institutions and ineffectual
governments (low G), the marginal productivity of effective human capital (h)
is likely to low, such that the binding constraint to per capita income growth is
in (3). As countries improve their governance levels, this constraint is relaxed,
such that human capital makes a positive and significant contribution to income
per capita. Finally, for countries with strong institutional frameworks (high G),
(3) no longer acts as a constraint to growth. Instead, continued output growth
bumps into diminishing marginal productivity, as embodied in the coefficient of
human capital in (5).
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we take an alternative approach to reconciling the apparent para-
dox between micro- and macro-level studies of the role of human capital in
income. Specifically, we have argued that the quality of institutions is central
to learning and education, so that the role of governance in a country’s growth
process operates primary though its intervening effect on human capital. Using
a range of empirical identification strategies, we have taken this theory to the
data, and found support for this conjecture at both the cross-sectional and panel
level.
Future research will consider more carefully the mechanisms underlying
changes in institutional quality, and its interactions with growth. In particular,
by allowing for a dynamic process of institutional change, it may be possible to
obtain steady-state expressions for not just human and physical capital, but also
institutions, and the interactions between these economic and political factors.
Empirical opportunities include directly testing the role of governance in edu-
cation using micro-level indicators of governance, such as teacher absenteeism
rates or the pervasiveness of informal payments in schooling.
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Appendix
A.1 Detailed Data Description
Educational attainment is the mean years of primary, secondary, and post-
secondary education received by the population aged 15 and older, normalized
for differential duration of education across countries. The (gross) enrollment
rate is the share of pupils enrolled at the secondary level, regardless of age,
relative to the theoretical age group for that level.
The consumption-investment ratio is total household and government con-
sumption expenditure divided by gross fixed capital formation (gross of changes
in the level of inventories), in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
The pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary school,
divided by the number of primary school teachers. The additional school input
is public education expenditure, which is the current and capital government
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spending on educational institutions (both public and private), education ad-
ministration, as well as educational subsidies for private entities, such as house-
holds.
Kaufmann et al. (2007) collect governance data according to six dimensions:
Voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regula-
tory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. As discussed in the text, the
measure of governance that we employ for most specifications includes only the
variable most likely to operate through human capital accumulation: govern-
ment effectiveness. Estimates for this variable are assumed to be drawn from a
normal distribution centered on zero with support [−1, 1]. We use the lagged
effectiveness variable from the year 1996. For the fuller governance measure, we
equally weight the 6 dimensions in the composite score to obtain an aggregate
governance measure.
The two instruments we use for governance in the robustness section are
common to those in Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Hall & Jones (1999): The
mortality rates of early European settlers and the fraction of the population
of European descent, specifically those speaking English and other European
languages.
For additional controls introduced in the robustness section: Trade openness
is taken to be net exports as a share of GDP, geography is the longitudinal dis-
tance from the equator, and infrastructure is proxied by road density, measured
as kilometers of road per 100 square kilometer of land area.
We obtained fractionalization data from Alesina, Easterly, Devleeschauwer,
Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003), democracy data from the Polity IV project Mar-
shall & Jaggers (2005), and social capital data from the World Values Survey.
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is the sum of the ethnic and linguistic fraction-
alization measures, which in turn were computed as one minus the Herfindahl
indices of the respective group shares in the population. The theoretical distri-
bution has the range [0, 2], with higher values indicating greater fractionaliza-
tion. Democracy is a composite indicator of the competitiveness of executive
recruitment and political participation, the openness of executive recruitment,
and the strength of constraints on the chief executive; it has the integer range
[0, 10], with higher values indicating greater democracy. Social capital is a mea-
sure of trust in the society, which is calculated from the response to the question,
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”
The indicator is binomial, distribution on support [1, 2], with lower values in-
dicating greater levels of trust. Following the literature, we assumed that trust
was time-invariant, and so countries with more than one survey were collapsed
into a single score by simple averaging.
For alternative variables used in the robustness section: Parental authority
is the father’s share of parental authority, which ranges from 0 (half share)
to 1 (full). This was obtained from the OECD’s Gender, Institutions, and
Development database. Ability was calculated average national IQ estimates,
adjusted to account for time differences as a result of the Flynn (2007) effect.
26
This was due to Lynn & Vanhanen (2002). Attainment is the sum of the student
performance in math and reading tests, adjusted for cross-country and cross-test
comparability, from Altinok & Murseli (2007).
We used adult schooling as an alternative measure of family input; this is the
mean schooling of the population aged 25 and over, and it serves as a proxy for
parental education as a family input into the education process. Adult (youth)
literacy is the percentage of the population aged 15 and older (aged 15–24) that
is able to read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.
A.2 Bayesian Analysis of Exclusion Restriction
First, projections of the dependent variable Y/L, endogenous regressor H/L,
and instrument G on the exogenous variables in the first stage, namely sk and
(n+ g + δ). Second, residuals corresponding to these projections were then
collected, and the variance of residuals corresponding to the instrument was
normalized to one. Third, 10,000 draws were taken from the posterior distri-
bution of pi2, for alternative values of ω. Finally, the 2.5th, 50th, and 97.5th
percentiles of this distribution were computed, together with the interquantile
ranges. The procedure is described in greater detail in Kraay (2008).
A.3 Additional Subsamples
We report additional panel regressions of subsamples of the data divided in
two separate ways: (a) Geographic distribution, with countries groups into five
broad regions: OECD, Latin America, Asia (to which we include South Asia),
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa (Table A.1); (b) Income level,
with countries grouped into high income (including both OECD and non-OECD
countries), lower-middle and upper-middle income, and low income (Table A.2).
Table A.1: Panel regressions of GDP per capita, by region†
OECD L. America Mideast Asia E. Europe Africa
Investment 0.044 0.402 0.039 0.465 0.232 0.012
share (0.13) (1.96) (0.07) (0.20)∗∗ (0.12)∗∗ (0.04)
Net rate of -0.027 0.638 -0.843 0.128 0.015 -0.243
depreciation (0.15) (1.89) (0.45)∗ (0.32) (0.13) (0.14)∗
Human -0.696 1.409 0.531 0.811 5.068 0.245
capital (0.99) (7.39) (0.26)∗∗ (0.26)∗∗∗ (1.27)∗∗∗ (0.18)
F 0.237 0.047 11.991∗∗∗ 9.617∗∗∗ 27.208∗∗∗ 4.835∗∗∗
Anderson LR 6.121∗ 0.112 3.526 9.566∗∗ 6.042 9.508∗∗
Cragg-Donald F 1.988 0.032 1.029 3.155 1.803 3.159
Hansen J 2.316 1.361 2.532 2.208 2.697 2.120
N 101 48 36 55 29 135
† Notes: Heteroskedasticity, cluster, and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic) standard errors
reported in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance
at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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Table A.2: Panel regressions of GDP per capita, by income level†
Low Lower middle Upper middle High
Investment 0.034 0.121 0.248 0.133
share (0.06) (0.13) (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)
Net rate of 0.128 -0.140 0.161 -0.173
depreciation (0.22) (0.25) (0.10)∗ (0.20)
Human 0.561 1.073 1.860 1.949
capital (0.30)∗ (0.30)∗∗∗ (0.64)∗∗∗ (1.15)∗
F 3.689∗∗∗ 9.429∗∗∗ 4.786∗∗∗ 16.100∗∗∗
Anderson LR 10.264∗∗∗ 12.344∗∗∗ 8.166∗∗∗ 4.915
Cragg-Donald F 3.423 4.168 2.668 1.598
Hansen J 1.327 1.967 6.138∗∗ 2.510
N 121 111 71 132
† Notes: Heteroskedasticity, cluster, and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic)
standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent
level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance
at 1 percent level.
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